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Abstract

I attempt to draw out some difficulties with what may at first seem an intuitive and uncontroversial picture of tactile sensation - a picture of tactile sensation as perception of spatial locations where these spatial locations serve as the units out of which we build our awareness of bodily position. Given these shortcomings, rather than continue to labour under this overall picture of tactile sensation as the epistemic foundation of our awareness of bodily position, I reverse the direction of explanation, taking an immediate awareness of bodily position as the epistemic foundation of tactile sensation. Brian O'Shaughnessy's perceptual theory, and Michael Martin's development of it - if correct - enable this reversal. I do not critically assess O'Shaughnessy and Martins' theories, at least not in much depth. However, by giving a clear account of the difficulties they may resolve, it is hoped that the scope and potential power of these theories has been demonstrated.







Introduction

We experience a sensation. 

This sensation is experienced as somewhere. 

Some questions flow from this observation:

Is the sensation thereby showing us where in objective space it resides?

Is it showing us where in a physical body it resides? If so, is it showing us where it resides relative to the bounds of this physical body, or relative to other sensations concurrently experienced as within this same physical body?

Is it showing us where in our physical body it resides? If so, is it showing us where it resides relative to the bounds of our physical body, or relative to other sensations concurrently experienced as within this same physical body?

Or that wherever it resides, it necessarily resides somewhere within the bounds of our physical body?

Or is this sensation, experienced as somewhere, in fact not showing us where it resides in objective space at all, but rather is, or gives rise to, a non-spatially located, purely mental, state?

Bodily sensory experience is experienced as somewhere, and these are the kind of questions that this fact has inspired. If the reader finds the above hopelessly vague, I sympathise, and will endeavour over the course of this dissertation to clarify what is meant by each of the terms and claims above. For now, the above is intended simply to introduce, in broad strokes, the issues involved in relating sensation to bodily position.

Each of the above questions decomposes into further questions. But before we get to that, let's try to clarify what we mean by 'sensation', and then go on to place the questions in context. 



A note about the intended scope of 'sensation': spatial properties

In this dissertation I will be restricting my discussion to sensation as it relates to spatial properties. The reason for this of course is that it is spatial properties which are of the most interest to us in our enquiry into our awareness of bodily position.

First of all we should note that it may be argued that some sensations, such as those involved in mood, may not be experienced as having any spatial properties. However I will leave the controversy surrounding this to one side and avoid discussing these cases.

So what kind of properties are spatial properties? By spatial properties I mean the position of entities relative to each other in space, and possibly also those positions as they change over time (as occurs in relative movement). In discussing a sensation such as pain, then, we would be interested in the location of the pain, rather than its non-spatial qualities such as its degree or type of painfulness. (I won't delve into the interesting question of whether degree and type of painfulness is constituted in part by where it is felt to be.) Similarly, in discussing roughness or smoothness, we would be interested in the judgements these properties lead us to regarding the spatial properties of the touched surface, rather than qualitative considerations about what it would be like to touch a rough as opposed to a smooth surface.

Complex spatial properties can be assembled from component positions. Lines, edges, angles, degrees of curvature, shape, size and volume are all mathematically defined by an infinity of positions and their spatial interrelationships. In theory, these more complex spatial properties are also candidates for being the spatial content of sensation. As a matter of contingent fact, though, it is unclear whether our senses are specialised for the simpler or the more complex spatial properties. 

Furthermore, there exist other properties which, while not themselves spatial, can be used by the tactile sense to come to determinations about spatial properties. Such properties could include 
	force, as the degree of force met by for example a finger as it moves across a three-dimensional object gives information about degree of curvature/slope, and
	torque applied by an object we are in contact with which thereby gives spatial information about its spatial relationship to our centre of mass.
In the case of force, the tactile sense combines with our awareness of our bodily movements to yield spatial information. In the case of torque, the tactile sense combines with our sense of our centre of mass to yield spatial information. And in both cases, the tactile sense must combine with our sense of the degree and kind of muscular activity necessary to respond to the force or the torque. As above, we are faced with the question as to whether the object of tactile sense is a very simple spatial property - position - or a compound including position, more complex spatial properties, and awareness of bodily properties such as movement and the relative position of the parts of the body. 

Moving on now from what is meant by 'spatial content', what is meant by the spatiality of sensation itself? 

The spatiality of sensation could be taken to refer to the spatial relationships that define the way sensations are arrayed in space. For example, it could be taken to refer to the spatial relationships between a pain in the elbow, a pain in a neighbouring area in the subject's body, and the nearest London underground station. This obviously assumes that a sensation can have a spatial location, and can adopt a certain spatial location relative to other objects or relative to other sensations.

Alternatively, the spatiality of sensation could be taken to refer to the spatial relationships that define the way in which those things which sensation reveals are arrayed in space. For example, it could be taken to refer to the spatial relationships obtaining between a painful elbow, a painful knee, and a bandage which one senses to wrapped around that knee.

A consideration of the relative merits of the above two alternatives will form a major part of this paper. After all, the second of those two alternatives is clearly much better placed to assign a role to sensation in our awareness of bodily position. .

We have five senses. While vision and audition and possibly the other senses have a role to play in our awareness of bodily position, I will restrict my focus to the sense of touch. It has been often observed that touch plays a dual role, revealing to us the spatial properties both of the object touched and the object that touches: both the spatial properties of the glass and of the hand that holds the glass. It is this unique feature of touch that makes it of interest to us as we are concerned with sensation and awareness of bodily position.

Philosophical discussions of touch sensation often focus exclusively on cutaneous sensation. I will seek to broaden this focus to include other types of touch sensation.

As we said, tactile sensation is traditionally taken to be sensation which could be either of an external object, or of one's own body. By contrast, proprioception, as the name suggests, pertains exclusively to one's own body. But what is proprioception? Does it involve sensation? Some argue that it does, though it may involve a broader class of sensation than just tactile sensation. The burden falls on people who argue this to show by what means we know that the sensation involved is sensation of our bodies. Others argue that proprioception involves perception, and that this perception may or may not be mediated by sensation. The burden falls on these people, equally, to show by what means we know that the perception involved is perception of our bodies. 

With this in mind, then, it is worth remembering that this controversy exists in the literature surrounding the relationship between sensation and proprioception. While in what follows a lot of time will be spent examining sensation, and the conclusions we arrive at about sensation will obviously have a bearing on proprioception, it is important to bear in mind that proprioception need not necessarily involve sensation.  

Sensation as perception: an overview of different positions

Having limited, for the purposes of this paper, what we mean by 'sensation', let's press on to enumerate and impose some order on the five questions above. 

Let's recast the questions as statements:

By being experienced as somewhere, sensation:

1)	shows us where in objective space it resides;

2)	shows us where in a physical body it resides. Thus, it either shows us where it resides relative to the parts and bounds of this physical body, or relative to other sensations concurrently experienced as within this same physical body;

3)	shows us where in our physical body it resides. Thus, it shows us where it resides relative to the parts and bounds of our physical body, or relative to other sensations concurrently experienced as within this same physical body;

4)	shows us that wherever it resides, it necessarily resides somewhere within the bounds of our physical body;

5)	while experienced as somewhere, does not in fact show us where it resides in objective space at all, but rather is, or gives rise to, a non-spatially located, purely mental, state.

All of the statements make reference to space. Do they intend to refer to real, objective, Cartesian space, the space occupied by and surrounding everyday physical objects? Or do they refer to space in at best a metaphorical way? If perception is taken to be necessarily the perception of spatial properties in objective space (and I take this to be uncontroversial), then categorising our five statements on the basis of whether they refer to objective spatial properties will track whether or not they are taking sensation to be a form of perception (of spatial properties). 

The statements, then, can be separated into two groups according to whether they refer to real, objective space: the first four statements, and the last statement. Correlatively, they fall to one side or the other of the divide in the 'sensation is perception' versus 'sensation is not perception' debate. It is important to get clear on whether sensation is perception or not before we enquire into the kind of thing sensation may or may not be a perception of. Only then can we address whether sensation may form the basis of perceptions of bodily position, or whether it perhaps serves our awareness of bodily position in some other, non-perceptual, way.

Let's look at the two positions, 'sensation is perception' and 'sensation is not perception', in turn. This dissertation will be mostly concerned with arguments based around the thesis that sensation is perception, so I will firstly address the view that sensation is not perception, to clear the ground for a lengthier treatment of the view that it is perception.

Sensation is not perception.

Recall statement 5) above:
5)	By being experienced as somewhere, sensation, while experienced as somewhere, does not in fact show us where it resides in objective space at all, but rather is, or gives rise to, a non-spatially located, purely mental, state.
Statement 5) takes a radical step away from the perceptual model of sensation. It commits us to taking bodily sensation as being purely mental and therefore non-spatial, with the fact that we experience sensation as somewhere being at best metaphorical and giving us no knowledge about a location in objective space or any spatial features of any objects in physical space. While a sensation may appear as being located, it is not in fact located anywhere. Sensation cannot give any spatial information. It looks very unpromising, then, as a candidate for enabling our awareness of bodily position. 

This idea that sensation is non-spatial is puzzling. The puzzlement is over how something non-spatial could relate to our intentions towards and acts within a spatial world of physical objects. This is structurally similar to the puzzlement over the mind-body problem, and the stance taken regarding one may track the stance taken in the other. For clearly there is some kind of relationship between sensation and our attitudes towards and abilities with respect to spatial features of the world. There are things I can do if I am touched with a feather on the elbow and experience a resultant sensation, which I could not do if I were under local anaesthesia (and blindfolded) and no sensation resulted from the feather's touch. I could indicate, verbally or ostensively, my elbow as the location which was touched by the feather. I could act towards or with the location that was touched. These abilities, however, can be (and have been, by, for example Wittgenstein and Anscombe) taken to be what sensation is, rather than what it enables. Having a sensation cashes out as a disposition to act. So, on this view, the undeniable relationship between sensation and spatial features of the world need not imply that sensations themselves are spatially located.

Somewhat similarly, philosophical positions which deny the existence of qualia would also of course hold that sensations - understood as qualia - are not required to mediate our perception of the world. Enactivism, for example, understands sensations as being the subject's mastery of the sensorimotor contingencies obtaining in a given perceptual situation. This means that for the enactivist, sensations are spatial insofar as the motor actions (actual or potential) that form the basis of the sensorimotor knowledge that constitutes perception, are spatial. However, an enactivist would not take a sensation to be spatial in the sense of being an intermediary between perceiver and perceived, where the content of the sensation was such as to inform the perceiver about spatial properties of the perceived. While enactivism does take sensation to be perceptual, it trades on such a specialised notion of perception (as being, essentially, action) that we will not include it in the 'sensation is perception' camp.

Above are two brief descriptions of positions which take sensation to be either non-spatial, or spatial only thanks to a reduction of sensation to (spatial) action. For now, allow this to dispatch any concerns about how to account for how sensations, if they do not give us knowledge about where they are occurring, enable us to act competently in physical space.

As we said, dividing the above questions into two groups in this way sets up a contrast between two different philosophical positions on sensation. The first holds that sensation is perceptual in nature; the second, that it is non-perceptual. I will now go on to develop the argument that sensation is perceptual. 


Sensation is perception.

Recall the first four of our statements above:

By being experienced as somewhere, sensation

1)	shows us where in objective space it resides;

2)	shows us where in a physical body it resides. Thus, it either shows us where it resides relative to the parts and bounds of this physical body, or relative to other sensations concurrently experienced as within this same physical body;

3)	shows us where in our physical body it resides. Thus, it shows us where it resides relative to the parts and bounds of our physical body, or relative to other sensations concurrently experienced as within this same physical body;

4)	shows us that wherever it resides, it necessarily resides somewhere within the bounds of our physical body.

These four statements would involve a commitment to the idea that bodily sensation provides information about the objective world 'out there'. (In one sense this claim is trivial: if a sensation is 'bodily' then obviously it must relate to the objective, spatial world. However, in using the term 'bodily sensation' I intend merely to follow a convention of distinguishing a certain class of sensations - pains, tickles, scratches and the like - which appear to the subject to be occurring on or in her body, as being bodily sensations. No commitment to the idea that just because they appear to be spatially located they are spatially located is to be assumed.) In this sense the statements trade on a perceptual model of bodily sensation, in which bodily sensation functions similarly to the senses of sight, exteroceptive touch, hearing, taste and smell, in that it mediates (or constitutes) our knowledge of the objective world. 

Bodily sensation could arise from a touch on the body's surface, or it could be endogenous. A toothache would be an example of the latter. These two classes of body sensation are distinguished in two ways. Firstly, only the first kind, tactile sensation, enables the subject to form judgements about the surface spatial properties of the object which is contacting the skin. (The further conditions that the contact be sustained, and/or that the object should move against the skin, may need to be met to allow the subject to form judgements about the object.) Secondly, where tactile sensation can occur only on the surface of the body (interior surfaces, such as the skin inside the mouth, are to be included here), other bodily sensations - toothaches, stomach aches, muscle aches, etc. - can occur within the surface of the body. 

For the moment, I am going to restrict my discussion to tactile bodily sensation. This is because of the special role that Michael Martin (1993, 1995)and Brian O'Shaughnessy (1980, 1995) ascribe to it in their account of our awareness of bodily position. Focussing on tactile sensation, therefore, will help us to relate our discussion to the views of Martin and  O'Shaughnessy. 

So what can be said of the view that tactile sensation is a kind of perception? One could say that such a view imports the structure of our explanations of exteroceptive tactile experience - that is, that they amount to tactile perception of an object such as the glass one is holding - into our explanations of interoceptive tactile experience - that is, that they, too, are perceptions of objects, where in this case the object is the perceiver's body. (This suggests another motivation for focussing on tactile sensation is that it may be that it is in virtue of the perception of the spatial properties of external objects that tactile perception can serve to alert us to the spatial properties of our own bodies. It is less clear how this could be the case for endogenous bodily sensations such as stomach aches.) On this view to have a sensation is to perceive the spatial characteristics of some physical object, be this the layout of corner, edge and plane on a cube, or the spatial characteristics of a human body.

We are now in a position to ask our next question: just what are the spatial characteristics of the human body that sensation is said to reveal? If exteroceptive tactile sensation is perception of the layout of corner, edge and plane on a cube, is interoceptive tactile sensation the perception of the layout of corner, edge and plane on a hand? 

Not necessarily. Let's take the statement 'interoceptive tactile sensation is the perception of the layout of corner, edge and plane on a hand' to be an endorsement of the thesis 'interoceptive tactile sensation is the perception of the spatial properties of the body'. Call this thesis T. It turns out that not all of statements 1) through 4) support T:

Statements 1), 2), 3) and 4), when taken in conjunction with the thesis that sensation is perception, imply that sensation is perception of the layout of sensations in physical space. 

But only 3) yields the conclusion that T is true. 1), 2) and 4) do not. 

	1) is necessary for T, but not sufficient. Sensation must indeed be perception of locations in physical space for T to be true, but for T to be true it must also be the case that these locations are known by the perceiving subject to belong to a physical body. (We are making an assumption here: we are assuming that it is only possible to have a sensation (perception) of spatial properties of a physical object. The spatial location in question must be occupied by a physical object, it cannot be empty space. For now we will accept this premise uncritically. However, we shall see later on that - surprisingly - some accounts of sensation lead to the conclusion that sensation of locations in empty space are indeed possible.)

	2) is necessary for T, but not sufficient. Sensation must indeed be perception of locations in physical space for T to be true, but for T to be true it must also be the case that these locations are known by the perceiving subject to belong to our physical body, not just any old physical body.

	4), like 2), is necessary but not sufficient for T. 4) ensures that the properties perceived belong to the perceiver's body, but not that these properties are spatial. To be sure, the perceived properties are perceived to be in the body, and so are spatial in this sense. But the properties are spatial in a very trivial sense, whereby the fact that they are perceived at all guarantees that they must be in the body. The experience of the sensation does not furnish any awareness of spatial properties in virtue of which the perceiver comes to know that the sensation is in the body. The proposition encapsulated in 4), namely that what is perceived involves spatial properties, is analytic, one might say, rather than synthetic.

This analysis helps us to further order our five statements. We already established a primary grouping separating 1) - 4) from 5). We said that statements 1) - 4) refer to objective spatial properties, and that they therefore model sensation on perception, while statement 5) doesn't. Now we can subdivide 1) - 4), as above, on the basis of whether or not they take the perception to be of spatial properties of the body. To repeat, 2) and 3) take the spatial properties to be of the body, whereas 1) and 4) do not. 

A yet further subdivision can be made, if we look more closely at 3). Recall 3):

	3) By being experienced as somewhere, sensation shows us where in our physical body it resides. Thus, it shows us where it resides relative to the parts and bounds of our physical body, or relative to other sensations concurrently experienced as within this same physical body.

3) is a disjunct. It makes the claim that sensation is perception of the location of this sensation i) relative to the parts and bounds of our physical body, or ii) relative to other sensations concurrently experienced as within this same physical body.

We need 3) to be true in order for T, the thesis that 'interoceptive tactile sensation is the perception of the spatial properties of the body', to be true. And, reminding ourselves of our overall aim - to clarify the role of sensation in our awareness of bodily position - it is clear that if we could demonstrate the truth of T we would have taken an enormous step closer to our aim. The truth of T, however, depends on the truth of 3), and unfortunately 3) is a very complex statement. 

Interoceptive tactile sensation is the perception of the spatial properties of the body.

Let's analyse 3) with a view to clarifying the two operants of the disjunct: 3i) and 3ii):

	3i) Sensation is perception of the location of this sensation relative to the parts and bounds of our physical body.

	3ii) Sensation is perception of the location of this sensation relative to other sensations concurrently experienced as within our physical body.

3i) requires the location of the sensation to be designated relative to the spatial layout of our physical body. A complete description of the spatial properties of the physical body now includes a description of the layout of the sensations experienced therein. But circularity threatens. If sensation is defined as the perception of the spatial characteristics of the body, and the spatial characteristics of the body are in turn designated exclusively in terms of the location of said sensations, then our definition becomes circular. To avoid this circularity, it will be necessary to supplement the perception with something else. We need an independent means of individuating the spatial characteristics of the body. Something that needn't be mediated by sensation perhaps, something immediate. As we shall see, it is Brian O'Shaughnessy's position that a very special notion of 'body image' serves this role. 

3ii) requires the location of the sensation to be designated relative to other sensations, and it also requires that all of these sensations be experienced as occurring within our physical body. Now this seems but a hairs' breadth from 3ii). Both 3i) and 3ii) locate sensations as occurring in the physical body. However, only 3i) locates sensation relative to the particular spatial layout of the physical body. If the spatial layout of the body were to change, then the spatial relationships between sensation and body parts would change. Consequently, the individuating criteria for the sensation would shift. The identity and persistence conditions for the sensation would no longer be met: that particular sensation would cease to exist. Sensation, according to 3i), depends for its very existence upon the spatial layout of the body. Crucially, this is not the case for 3ii). 3ii) implies that, just so long as it is perceived to be occurring somewhere within the physical body, it could be occurring anywhere within the body - indeed its location within the body could change. The individuating criteria of a sensation, as claimed by 3ii), are (just so long as they are occurring somewhere in the body) the spatial relationships holding between it and other sensations in this same body. According to 3ii), sensation is dependent for its existence on the sensing person's body within which it occurs, but it is not dependent for its existence upon any particular spatial layout of this body.

Let's try and and ground all this abstraction with an example. Let's say that I am sitting on a chair with my right foot hovering just off the floor in front of me, roughly on the same vertical plane as my hip joint. My leg is bent at the knee. I have a sensation at a particular point in my lower leg, and another sensation at a particular point in my upper leg. Imagine also a point, P, at the lowermost part of my tibia. Now, keeping P absolutely still, and keeping the centre of rotation of my right hip joint absolutely still, I move my knee to the right (I externally rotate my hip joint) and then to the left (I internally rotate my hip joint). The leg is being moved in the manner of a bucket handle being lifted and lowered from the side of the stationary bucket. A small amount of rotation of the lower leg in a transverse plane relative to the upper leg is anatomically possible, but let's stipulate that I succeed in performing the above actions while keeping the lower leg in a fixed relationship to the upper leg. Furthermore, let's suppose that these two sensations are felt on the surface of the upper and lower leg bones (to avoid complicating factors related to movement-induced distortion of the spatial properties of skin and flesh). Then what we have here is a case of two sensations, one in the upper leg and one in the lower leg, remaining in a constant spatial relationship to one another even while their locations in physical space are changing, and, more particularly, while their locations relative to other body parts - say the head) - varies. The knee turning action has changed the spatial layout of the body. For 3i) this would entail that the individuating criteria for the sensations has changed, and that consequently the sensations are no longer the same. For 3ii), on the other hand, while the spatial layout of the body has changed, the sensations still meet the minimal requirement that they should be experienced as occurring somewhere within the body, and since their spatial relationships to one another remain constant, the two sensations perdure intact through all moments of the execution of the knee experiment. In a nutshell, for 3i) the sensations cease to exist, where in 3ii) the sensations continue to exist. So, in terms of these consequences, 3i) and 3ii) are more than a hair's breadth apart. 

It could be objected at this point that the knee turning experiment involves a change in spatial layout of the body only with respect to the moving part - the right leg - in which the sensations are located. So the sensations change their spatial relationships to stationary parts of the body - the head, for example - while their spatial relationships to the body part within which they are actually located remain constant. The objection could be raised that the change in spatial layout of the body overall is irrelevant to the location of the sensations, which, it could be argued, should be specified relative only to the body part within which it occurs. The location of the sensation relative to the leg is what counts, not its location relative to the head, or to the body's overall spatial layout. This objection could be overcome, however, in the following way. Replace the bent leg situation with a straight leg situation. The leg, as I internally and externally rotate the hip joint, is straight, not bent. The leg is now moving in the manner of a doner kebab. Let's now imagine that the two sensations are both located in the axis of rotation of the leg. This means that, as the leg rotates, the two sensations neither change their location in objective space nor relative to each other, and nor do they change their location relative to the rotating leg. Meanwhile, the spatial layout of the body as a whole, and of the moving leg, does change - the kneecap, for example, varies its position throughout the movement from being to the left of the axis of rotation to being to the right, and from being further or nearer to some point on the body's midline, such as the nose. 

Having overcome this objection, we can conclude that the individuation, and therefore existence, conditions of sensation, according to 3ii), are independent of the spatial layout of the physical body in which they occur. 

As 3) is a disjunct, we need only one of 3i) and 3ii) to be true in order to secure the truth of 3). And as we said earlier, 3) must be true if T, the thesis that interoceptive tactile sensation is the perception of the spatial properties of the body, is to be true. Would we want to say that either or both of 3i) and 3ii) are true? Having clarified the subtle but important difference between 3i) and 3ii), what would need to be the case for each of them to be true?

3i), recall, claims that sensation is perception of the location of this sensation relative to the parts and bounds of our physical body. To avoid circularity, as discussed above, we would need to show there is an independent means of individuating the spatial characteristics of the body. In assessing 3i), we will look at Brian O'Shaughnessy's theory of body image and its function in individuating sensation. If we are convinced by his argument, we will be persuaded of the truth of 3i).

And what would need to be the case for 3ii) to be true? 3ii), recall, claims that sensation is perception of the location of this sensation relative to other sensations concurrently experienced as within our physical body. It has the consequence that sensation is individuated independently of the spatial layout of the physical body. This liberates sensation of the constraint that, when undergoing a sensation, one must simultaneously be undergoing an experience as of our own body as exhibiting a certain spatial layout. Sensation, according to 3ii), could be a perception which enjoys spatial properties (the spatial relations to other sensations) without necessitating a concurrent experience of the spatial layout of the body in which it occurs. Recall what we pointed out in the opening sections, namely that tactile sensation has a dual aspect, capable of revealing both the external object (exteroception) and the object, say the hand, that is in contact with this object (interoception). In revealing an external object and the contacting hand, tactile sensation reveals just the spatial relationships between the sensations involved, plus the fact that these sensations necessarily are located within the body. It reveals the spatial relationships between the sensations that occur within the plane of contact, but not the spatial relationships between these sensations and the overall posture the body is adopting. At most, does sensation reveals only the layout of those spatial properties which are defined as being the locations of the current sensations. It reveals a plane of contact, but not the plane as it stands in spatial relationship to our body.

Think of it this way. Is tactile sensation revealing the plane of contact in a way that could be specified independently of the particular spatial layout of the body at this time? If so, then we could not say that tactile sensation is revealing our body's spatial layout. Or, is tactile sensation revealing the plane of contact such that it appears as part of the physical object that is our body, that is, as co-defining the particular spatial layout of the body at this time? If so, then we could say that tactile sensation is revealing our body's spatial layout, and we would have told an important part of the story about the role sensation plays in our awareness of bodily position.

So, how plausible is it that we do in fact experience spatial properties of our plane of contact with objects in a way which is abstracted from our awareness of those spatial properties in relation to the particular spatial layout of our body overall? Can we really experience a plane of contact as an abstract object, other than as a part of an overall perception of our own body? 

We need to settle the issue of whether or not 3ii) is plausible, for if it is, it supports the truth of T, and if it is not, then we are relying on 3i) to support the truth of T.

Sensation as perception which is individuated independently of perception of the spatial properties of the body overall.

Earlier, I mentioned the dual nature of tactile perception, its ability to function both exteroceptively and interoceptively. I would like to back up a little now, and explore how this works. I will do so by contrasting the tactile sense with the sense of vision. Then, through the lens of  the example of holding a glass in one's hand, I will return to the issue of the plausibility or otherwise of 3ii).

Sensation is a very comprehensive term, generally taken to be a discrete, identifiable unit of the conscious experience of sentient creatures. Traditionally it is identified relative to the sensory modality - sight, hearing, etc. - of which it is an instance. Within these primary sense-specific distinctions, more refined distinctions can be made. Two instances of visual sensation, for example, can be distinguished from one another. We would distinguish a visual sensation as of red from one as of green, for instance, or as of a straight edge from one as of a serrated edge. Notice here, of course, that the distinction is made with reference to the object perceived. Without referring to the features of the thing perceived - red or green - one is at a loss to distinguish between the two sensations. 

This is complicated in the case of the sense of touch, as the difference between a tactile sensation of something other than our body and of our body itself is markedly different from the difference between a visual sensation as of something other than our body and of our body itself. This should be apparent in the very awkwardness of saying 'visual sensation' rather than our more usual talk of 'visual perception', where there is no such awkwardness in the term 'tactile sensation'. It is very natural for us to think of visual experience as being somehow in direct epistemic contact with the object seen. Talk of visual perceptions of apples, rather than visual sensations of apples, is faithful to our sense of this direct contact. This is not just due to the contingent fact that while technically every sense modality has equal right, as it were, to label its deliverances 'sensations', in practice this nomenclature is reserved for the tactile sense. It is awkward to speak of visual sensations because this suggests the existence of something in the conscious process of coming to know about something that we could in principle attend to as an object or event in its own right, and this doesn't seem right. There doesn't seem to be any intermediary, in the case of vision, between a visual investigation of an object and awareness of the object (by 'object' here I obviously mean some element within a visual field, I do not mean something which we apprehend only after a further conscious process of subsuming such elements under a concept). It is natural to speak of tactile sensations, by contrast, because this suggests the existence of something in the conscious process of coming to know about something that we could in principle attend to as an object or event in its own right, and this does seem right. Herein lies the difference in the way perception of our bodies, and of objects other than our bodies, plays out in vision and touch. In touch, it seems as though we can come to know about objects via bodily sensation, where this sensation is an intermediary that we can attend to. When I see something, be it something outside my body or one of my own body parts, I see one thing. When I touch something, I feel one thing, the object touched, but it is as if a second object simultaneously springs into my awareness - the body part touched.

We have been talking about the difference between sensations of our body as opposed to sensations of things outside our body. Tactile sensation can be as of an object falling outside of our bodies (the glass we are holding) or as of our body itself (our hand as it holds the glass).  There are thus, as we have mentioned before, two types of tactile sensation: exteroceptive (the object is outside our body) and interoceptive (the object is our body). How are these two sub-varieties of tactile sensation differentiated? They can be differentiated with respect to the kind of object they are sensations of: an external object or the perceiver's own body. However, in saying there are two sub-varieties of tactile sensation, we have made an assumption. We have assumed that sensations, if they are of two different objects, must be distinct. This is a natural assumption to make. Going back to the case of vision, we would say that a visual sensation as of the left hand page of a book is a different sensation from the sensation as of the right hand page of the book. But in the case of touch, the following question arises: could one and the same sensation mediate our relationship to the things perceived? If so, there could be one tactile sensation which has two objects, hand and glass. Alternatively, are there two tactile sensations: one associated with each object? That is to say, is there one sensation which has as its object both the glass and the hand holding the glass; or is there one sensation of the glass and another sensation of the hand holding the glass? 

If sensation amounts to a perception of spatial properties then, since hand and glass are in contact, the perceived spatial properties shall exactly coincide. Or more precisely, the spatial properties of the external contours of those parts of hand and glass which are in contact with each other are identical - they form the same plane. The tactile sensation of holding a glass, then, if this sensation is taken to amount to perception of the spatial properties of the contacted surface, is a perception of spatial features which can be predicated of both the glass and of the hand. It is perception of a set of spatial features which define a plane in space, where both glass and hand possess this plane, such that a description of the plane is, for both glass and hand, a partial description of the overall set of spatial features possessed. On this account, if sensation is perception, then the individuating conditions of individual sensations can only be the perceptual content. Consequently, if perception is of the same thing - the plane at which glass and hand make contact - then there can only be one sensation at play. One object perceived, therefore one sensation.

How does this conclusion, that tactile sensation is of only one object, relate to 3)? 3) states that sensation is perception of the location of this sensation relative to either the parts and bounds of our physical body, or to other sensations concurrently experienced as within our physical body. In either case, it is perception of more than just the plane of contact. It is perception of this plane of contact as occurring within the context either of the spatial layout of the physical body, or of the spatial layout of other sensations.

This conclusion - one object perceived, therefore one sensation - then, is in tension with 3). The idea that only one object is perceived is in fact much more in line with 1). This is because 1) states that sensation shows us where in objective space it resides, and perception of a plane does at least achieve this much. However, problematically, 1) does not support T.

At this point, let's be mindful of our overall aim, which is to come to an understanding of our awareness of the spatial properties not just of some abstract object, such as a plane in space, but of the spatial properties of our bodies. If we are perceiving one object - the plane of contact - then we must somehow supplement this in order to arrive at an awareness of this object, this plane, as describing the spatial features of our body. According to the above description, perception is of a plane, which could be described mathematically as a location in objective space, and which could be occupied by any physical object whatsoever, or indeed by no object whatsoever and just exist in empty space. Perception of such a thing is not sufficient to furnish an awareness of bodily position. It is not just an account of perception we are after, we are after an account of proprioception. And if tactile sensation is indeed perception of a plane, abstracted from the physical body of which it is a feature, then it is unclear how tactile sensation contributes to proprioception.

It could be that tactile sensation does not after all play a part in proprioception. We noted earlier that not all accounts of proprioception or of our awareness of bodily position assign a necessary role to tactile sensation. But even if tactile sensation is not necessary to our awareness of bodily position, it does seem that it at least can serve to bring about awareness of our bodily position. We concluded above that tactile sensation is of the plane of contact, independent of the objects to which that plane belongs. Yet I don't suppose I am alone in seeing a very striking artificiality in this way of setting things up. Perhaps this artificiality ought to alert us to the fact that there may be something wrong in our conclusion about tactile sensation. Let's look at what might account for this artificiality. 

Immediate concerns with the idea that tactile sensation is as of an abstract plane.

It just doesn't seem phenomenologically accurate to say that a conscious perception of a plane functions as an element within an overall project to come to know about the object of which this plane is a property. It is as if we are being invited to consider perception of this plane as a dissociable element which can be variably combined with other elements to produce some kind of a composite perception of either a hand or a glass. And yet in lived experience surely we are aware of a full-bodied object of one kind or another, rather than the abstraction of a plane? There is an oddness in the idea of perceiving a plane, the plane of contact between two objects in isolation from either object - that is to say, in isolation from any other features that would enable us to identify the plane as belonging to one or other of the two objects. This oddness derives from the oddness of choosing to attend to one's own body, where usually our body is experientially transparent and works unattended-to in the background, as it were, to enable us to attend to the external object. This oddness has been frequently pointed out, and consists mostly in the unusualness of foregrounding the body in our awareness.

It could be objected that the oddness arises from my taking the perception of the plane to be conscious. The sensation in question, the one common to the perception of the hand and to the perception of the glass, is a perception of a plane, but this could be an unconscious perception. It could be that we unconsciously perceive a plane, and that this enables a conscious perception of either a hand or a glass. I think we are disqualified from making this move as tactile sensation is generally taken to be sensation which is at least in principle conscious. While tactile sensation can be 'attentively recessive', to use Brian O'Shaughnessy's phrase (he usually used this phrase in the context of proprioception, but it can also hold for tactile sensation), it is something that we can bring our conscious attention to. In the course of any act or while  in contact with any surfaces, we should be able to enquire of ourselves 'What tactile sensations are available to my conscious awareness right now?' It wouldn't make sense to answer that there are some tactile sensations which exist, but which are not available to my conscious awareness. It could certainly be the case that nervous activity is occurring that, under other physiological or psychological circumstances, may have lead to sensation which is available to consciousness, but for whatever reason is not currently available. But this would not be suffice to render such nervous activity sensation. For there to be sensation, there must be a conscious subject of that sensation. And it is not clear to me how one can be consciously aware of a plane, in isolation from or in addition to an awareness of an object to which that plane belongs. 

So perhaps the oddness can be accounted for simply by the fact that tactile sensation is usually attentively recessive. Perhaps, however, the oddness runs deeper than this, and could be alerting us to fundamental problems with our assumptions about how tactile perception functions. The assumption that perception could be of an abstract plane can be criticised from two angles. It could be criticised by invoking a special sense of space as it is experienced within the tactile field,as it were, as opposed to the field of objective space. Or it could be criticised by pointing out that it is inherently odd to abstract a single property - a plane in this case - as though we could perceive this in isolation from the context within which we perceive it. I will now look at both of these criticisms  - the idea that sensation occurs in 'subjective' space, and the idea that tactile sensation is contextual - in turn.

Tactile sensation occurs in 'subjective' space.

The idea that tactile sensation is perception of spatial properties such as those a plane can enjoy might derive from the following unwarranted assumption. There is an assumption woven into the above account that the spatial features involved be spatial features defined in objective, Cartesian space. Might it not be that sensation does have spatial content, but that this content is not of a kind with the spatial content of objective, Cartesian space?

Filip Mattens uses a thought experiment to show how tactile sensation can be spatial in less than the full-blooded sense of the objective spatiality enjoyed by physical objects:

'I am blindfolded and my ears are covered. I feel a needle prick somewhere on my thigh. No doubt, this point contact-sensation is felt somewhere. Then I feel a second sting a bit further on, and a third, and so on. Now, does it make sense to say that the felt location of these sensations provides an awareness of the worldly positions where the needles were when they pricked me?
The different stings are felt at different locations, and in this way a certain characteristic of my bodily self comes to the fore; namely, my body appears as extended, which means, at the very least, that I feel something at different places of my body. This experience implies that my body appears as having different places. In a certain sense, the spatiality of my body itself is experienced, and, simultaneously, my body appears as spatial. Clearly, if I had no feelings in my body, my body would not appear. Conversely, when something moves all over my body, my entire body becomes manifest. Without the possibility of continuous change of location, my body would not appear as the one spatial body that it is. If these stings were not felt in different locations, all stings would be felt as a repetition of the same sting; this means that the corresponding sensations would only differ in intensity, and no body would appear. But, this is not true of us. On the contrary, the location of sensations in the body precisely allows that something can contact all the areas on one's body, one after another, in exactly the same way. Thus, having no visual or auditory perceptions, I become immediately aware of my body and its spatial nature without thereby being aware of "real" locations in the world. The question then is whether this spatiality informs me about the spatiality of the world: is it sufficient to say that the felt location of contact informs me about the location of the contact felt?'​[1]​

Mattens here is making two important points. He is suggesting that it is possible for there to exist a spatial manifold which does not correspond to objective space, and he is also suggesting that tactile sensation can be individuated other than by its putative location in objective space (he mentions that  sensations can be individuated by intensity rather than location). To begin with the first point, that sensation can be located spatially, though not in the space of real-world objects, we can see that this introduces an as yet unconsidered possibility. We have been assuming that sensation must be either located in objective space or be a mental, and therefore non-spatial, phenomenon. But, according to Mattens, a third possibility exists, namely that sensation can be spatial, it can be genuinely somewhere, yet not located anywhere in the manner in which physical objects are located. Consequently the extended thing that sensation reveals cannot be identical with the human body as it exists as a physical object in the world. Mattens introduces his thought experiment in the context of an exposition of Husserl's view on the 'lived body' as opposed to the body experienced as object. It is not my intention to examine Husserl's views on this here, beyond noting that the notion of this special kind of a spatial manifold has been used to argue for two different conceptions of the body. 

With this in mind, let's return to our discussion of the plane formed by the contact between hand and glass. Were we mistaken to assume that the spatial features of the tactile sensation must coincide with the spatial features of a plane in objective space? If a plane if formed by the spatial relationships between points, then must tactile sensation as of this plane also be formed by the spatial relationships between the objective locations of sensations of points? Could it not be that the spatial features of the tactile sensation of the plane are of a different kind than the spatial features of the plane itself? (And if so, does the idea of attending to a plane, construed as experienced in this sense of spatiality specific to tactile sensation of the body, seem less artificial than the idea of attending to a plane as it exists in objective space?)

Notice, here, that an affirmative answer to the above question is available if we adopt 3ii), but not if we adopt 3i). Once again:

	3i) Sensation is perception of the location of this sensation relative to the parts and bounds of our physical body.

	3ii) Sensation is perception of the location of this sensation relative to other sensations concurrently experienced as within our physical body.


Both 3i) and 3ii) require that we experience our sensations as occurring within our bodies, as opposed to in some other body, or in empty space. But only 3i) requires that we individuate sensations by means of their location relative to the bounds and parts of the physical body. Our conclusion above that tactile sensation involves only one object  - the plane of contact - entails that the sensation is located independently of the bounds and parts of the physical body. So if our conclusion that tactile sensation has only one object is true then 3i) must be false.

If 3i) is false, then for 3), which is the disjunct of 3i) and 3ii), to be true, 3ii) must be true. 

3ii), we saw, has the consequence that we can do away with the constraint that, when undergoing a sensation, one must simultaneously be undergoing an experience as of our own physical body as exhibiting a certain spatial layout. Up to this point, we assumed that this spatial layout would of course be in objective space. If, however, Mattens is correct to suggest that sensation is spatial, but not in the sense of objective space, then 3ii) becomes much more plausible.

3ii) allows that we could come to experience our sensations as necessarily occurring on or in the physical body independently of experiencing our sensations as located relative to the bounds or parts of the body. We could take it that our sensations must be occurring on or in the body on the basis of something other than their location relative to the body. We will see later that Michael Martin sets forth some possibilities as to what might form this basis. If we could use Matten's point about 'subjective' space, together with Martin's arguments, to support 3ii), then we ought to be able to demonstrate the plausibility of 3ii). This would support the plausibility of 3), which would in turn support T.

However, there are problems with the view that the spatial features of the tactile sensation of the plane are of a different kind than the spatial features of the plane itself is problematic. The immediate consequence of this idea that  is that if it were so it then becomes very hard to see how one and the same sensation can afford information about two different objects - hand and glass - where only the hand can be experienced within the special kind of non-objective spatial framework outlined above. The idea of one sensation with two different objects comes under pressure. The hand seems to be experienced in one 'format', as it were, while the glass is experienced in another.

We must could conclude, then, that if sensation has location it must have a location in a space which could equally be occupied by a physical object. 3) remains in tension with the claim that sensation is of one object: the suggestion of 'subjective space' fails to resolve this tension.

Tactile sensation is contextual.

We will now raise the possibility that sensation is indeed of only one object, but that it can be supplemented in order to yield both interoceoptive and exteroceptive content. There could be sensation of one object only, but this object could be perceived as a hand or as a glass, depending upon its supplementation by further sensations, or by the context within which it occurs. Perhaps momentary contact with an object, or contact which is sustained but invariant (holding the glass rather than exploring the glass), is sufficient to give an awareness of a plane, but not sufficient to give an awareness of any external object as such. Perhaps it is wrong to assume that sensation could be of spatial properties in isolation from the objects of which they are a feature. In our introductory remarks about the spatial content of sensation we did query whether as a matter of contingent fact our tactile sense may be specialised for more complex spatial properties, properties which we only come to be aware of when our tactile sense is combined with, for example, muscular activity. 

This possibility, in the bare form in which I have introduced it thus far, is redolent of philosophical views which take perception to be a kind of action. Alva Noe, for example, a philosopher of this persuasion, has the following to say about his experience of feeling a bottle:

Suppose you hold a bottle in your hands with your eyes shut. You feel it. You have
the feeling of the presence of the whole bottle even though you only make finger-
to-bottle contact at a few points​[2]​. 

Clearly to the extent that the bottle is wholly present, as a bottle, in our experience, this cannot be accounted for by any sensations arising solely from 'finger-to-bottle contact at a few points', for these few points do not suffice to furnish an appreciation of the spatial properties of the bottle as a whole. An enactivist, such as Noe, would claim that the appearance of the bottle, rather than of those planes of the bottle's surface with which one enjoys momentary or invariant contact, is to be explained by the fact that perception is an active, temporally extended process, wherein we bring to bear our knowledge of the ways in which the input of our senses varies with our motor actions. An enactivist would say, therefore, that it is wrong-headed to think of momentary or invariant tactile sensation as being sufficient for the perception of a bottle (or, in our example, a glass). An enactivist would also make a stronger claim rejecting the whole idea of sensations as building blocks out of which we could 'construct' a perception of an object such as a bottle or glass. But the arguments for and against that stronger claim are not my concern here. Rather, I introduce one of the claims of enactivism - that perception of an external object qua object is not possible on the sole basis of the spatial features of the sensation of the plane upon which one comes into contact with that object. Perhaps such a sensation would have to be supplemented with something like motor action before it could amount to a perception of a determinate object. Without such supplementation, it may only afford spatial features pertaining to the hand plus an apprehension that these spatial features could be shared by some other object without this apprehension being sufficient to determine which other object.

On this view, then, not only is perception of a plane not sufficient for the perception of two objects, hand and glass, it is not even, in itself, sufficient for the perception of any determinate object.

The consequences of our discussion of sensation for our understanding of proprioception.

To recap, we started out by asking whether one and the same tactile sensation could be as of two different objects. We made the claim that tactile sensation is perception. Having restricted our discussion to tactile sensation of spatial properties, we can say that what is perceived will be spatial properties. Perceptions are individuated in terms of perceptual content. We noted that if what is perceived is the plane upon which the surface of hand and glass make contact, then the perceptual content as of the hand is identical to the perceptual content as of the glass. We then brought into question whether a plane is in fact something that is perceived in tactile sensation: it seems phenomenologically inaccurate to say that it is. 

In response to this worry we then considered two possibilities: the possibility that the spatial features in question are not features arrayed in objective space; and the possibility that the tactile sensation needs to be supplemented  - by, for example, motor action - before the plane could be perceived as belonging to a determinate physical object. 

We rejected the first possibility, and are forced to the conclusion that 3ii), even with the support of the notion of 'subjective' space, is not plausible.

We saw that if the second possibility is true, then a single tactile sensation is not sufficient for perception of two objects: something in addition to this single tactile sensation is required. If tactile sensation plus action is sufficient for sensation being the perception of two objects, then we have shown that our awareness of bodily position relies on more than just tactile sensation. This would be an interesting conclusion, and worthy of further investigation. I will leave this avenue alone, however, concentrating on tactile sensation on its own, as this is what our question asks us to consider.

In sum, 3ii) has been rejected, so if we hope to save 3), we must now turn to 3i).

3i), recall, claims that sensation is perception of the location of this sensation relative to the parts and bounds of our physical body. To avoid circularity, as discussed above, we would need to show there is an independent means of individuating the spatial characteristics of the body. In assessing 3i), we will look at Brian O'Shaughnessy's theory of body image and its function in individuating sensation. If we are convinced by his argument, we will be persuaded of the truth of 3i).

O'Shaughnessy (1995) gives the following outline of one theory of sensation's relationship to proprioception and our awareness of bodily position.

"One theory is that bodily sensation occupies much of the body outside when proprioception occurs, that this entire complex of sensation maps reliably onto the body outside, and that awareness of these sensations and their spatial properties is epistemologically prior to awareness of the body and its space. In short, bodily sensation makes possible and explains proprioceptive spatial content by bringing to awareness its own shape, which in turn represents that of the body." p191.

He refers to this theory as Sensation Representationalism. We can see immediately that something like Sensation Representationalism has been underlying our discussion so far. We have been assuming that the right way to go about things is to first account for the spatial properties of sensation, and then treat sensation as the epistemological foundation of our awareness of bodily position. O'Shaughnessy, however, suggests that the direction of explanation runs in the other direction, from proprioception to sensation. He points out that Sensation Representationalism

"faces overwhelming difficulties. Thus sensations always require a principle or framework of differentiation, and even in the case of sight it is the body that satisfies this need through providing differential differentia, while it is certainly the body that provides the framework in the case of bodily sensations. It follows that the spatial properties of bodily sensations cannot be the epistemological foundation of the spatial content of proprioception. In any case, relative to what would these epistemologically prior sensations acquire a place in space for their owner? If we say relative to the body, we are thinking in a circle, while if we say relative to nothing, how can spatial differences be given to the perceiver? The conclusion must be that a sensation-prepresentationalist theory of proprioception is false, and that bodily sensations come in the first place to awareness with a body-space as the required framework of location, differentiation, and individuation." p191.

Here he is alluding to the same circularity that we pointed out earlier, in our discussion of 3i). 

O'Shaughnessy continues,

"It is at this point that the aforementioned puzzle concerning proprioception appears.  Whence the spatial content of proprioception if not via that of postural/bodily sensations? Whence that content, particularly if bodily sensation is the means through which we experience such a content? This is the puzzle, and it requires a drastic solution. The only way out of this difficulty is to posit a massive contribution on our part to the formation of the proprioceptive experience - something which ought in principle to be possible, if we bear in mind that in proprioception we continually perceive the one and the same object. It seems that we ourselves must bring the spatial content to the proprioceptive experience, and do so upon receiving the stimulus of sensation. More exactly, remembering that sensations mutate as posture alters, we must bring all of the space that we encounter in proprioception - minus the differentia of posture. It is, I think, in this way that we come by the theory of the long-term body image. Once we recognize the untenability of sensation representationalism in proprioception, it seems unavoidable."p191.

It is the need to solve this puzzle which motivate O'Shaughnessy to posit something other than sensation which accounts for the spatial content of sensation. He introduces a theoretical entity to explain spatial content in a way that is immediate, unmediated by sensation. This theoretical entity is what he calls the 'long term body image'. He also introduces three 'short term body images'. Any body posture that we adopt at any moment can be described with reference to these three body images, which are constituted, respectively, by all the points on the 'body outside' which are perceived, which are perceptible, and which are potentially perceptible. The long term body image transcends the particulars of the three short term body images, and accounts for the spatial content of the short term body images.

It is not my aim to make a detailed excursion into Brian O'Shaughnessy's theory of long and short term body images. It is enough for our purposes to note that the long term body image is intended as something which is immediately known to us. What consequence would this have for our model of tactile sensation as a perception of the plane of contact between the body and the object felt, between glass and hand? It would have the consequence that tactile sensation could, but need not, mediate our perception of the glass. This, in turn, would have have the consequence that the object of tactile sensation - the plane of contact - need not form the basis out of which we build up our awareness of our bodily position. The spatial properties of the plane of contact need not be our starting point in attempting to account for the spatial properties of our body of which that plane forms a part. The advantage of this is that the problems we encountered earlier would not arise. We attempted to account for how the spatial properties of a plane of contact could suffice to inform the subject about the physical object plane belonged, and we ran into difficulties. Rather than continue to search for solutions to these difficulties, a strategy could be to critically assess O'Shaughnessy's theory of proprioception as immediate 'body sense', for if he is right, then our difficulties are dissolved.

There is a further consequence of O'Shaughnessy's theory, and this relates to 3ii) rather than 3i). To recap, 3ii) did not suffer from the circularity that threatened 3i). However, it did suffer from the fact that it entailed that the object of tactile sensation is a plane of contact perceived in the abstract, independently of our physical body, and this seemed counter-intuitive or implausible. We attempted to resolve this implausibility by considering the possibility that tactile sensation occurs in 'subjective space'. However, this tactic failed as it left us unable to account for how tactile sensation could be of a plane that could be occupied by any physical object at all. 3ii) also suffered from the problem that if tactile sensation reveals a plane of contact, while remaining silent about its spatial relations to the rest of our physical body, then it is unclear how tactile sensation of a plane of contact could further our awareness of bodily position.

O'Shaughnessy's theory, if correct, has consequences for 3ii). This is because of the way in which Michael Martin's theory is built out of O'Shaughnessy's theory. I will now give a very brief outline of Martin's theory of tactile sensation. In "Bodily Awareness: A Sense of Ownership" (1995), Martin argues that tactile sensation is a form of perception of the body part in which it occurs. Further, we necessarily know that any tactile sensation we experience falls within the boundaries of our body. This allows for the possibility that our body coincides with the entire universe, but this possibility is blocked by the fact that I experience my body as a bounded object which is located within a space that could include other objects. In arguing for our experience of our body as one object among many, Martin invokes awareness of our overall bodily position, not sensation. In this he echoes the direction of explanation employed by O'Shaughnessy. Martin's position derives directly from the groundwork provided by O'Shaughnessy.

"Consider the spatial content of kinesthetic experiences.... If you raise your hands above your head, you will be aware of the position of both hands in space relative to each other. This awareness of their relative positions is an awareness of how they are displaced across a region of space beyond the space in which your body is located and in which you have neither kinesthetic nor sensational awareness. In this case, to give an adequate account of the spatial content of kinesthesia, we have to make reference to regions of space of which the subject is not currently in a position to have bodily experience. More generally, in having a sense of the shape of your body through kinesthetic awareness, you will be aware of this shape as in a space that extends beyond the limits of your body and encloses it. So the locations where one's hands feel to be are felt to be locations within a space that extends beyond the space one is then aware of. In turn, the sense of falling within a boundary may be no more than the sense that the location in question is within a space that seems to extend into regions that one could not currently be aware of in this way. Any region in which it seems to one that one could now be feeling sensation will thereby feel to one to fall within one of one's boundaries; at the same time, one has the sense that there are locations outside of one's boundaries, whatever these happen to be, since the space one feels these locations to be part of feels as if it extends beyond whatever one does feel." p271.

We mentioned Martin's claim that sensation is necessarily experienced as falling within one's body's boundaries when discussing 3). We noted that 3) entails that sensation falls within the bounds of one's body, and it was mentioned that Martin has developed an argument in support of this. This support is necessary for the truth of 3ii), since the fact that sensations fall within the body cannot be derived from the spatial relations of the sensations to the bounds and parts of the body.

Having given a brief outline of Martin's argument, we must assess it with a view to determining whether it does in fact support 3ii).

Let's now reintroduce the leg rotation experiment that we used earlier to bring out the difference between 3i) and 3ii). We will introduce the same experiment now for a different purpose. There were two versions of the leg rotation experiment - one with a bent leg (bucket handle) and one with a straight leg (doner kebab). Under the bent leg condition, the two sensations in upper and lower leg remain in the same relationship to one another but there is empty space between them. Under the straight leg condition, the two sensations in upper and lower leg remain in the same relationship to one another but there is no empty space between them: all the space between them is occupied by leg. So what? The relevance of this distinction comes out when we consider Michael Martin's justification for his claim that proprioception reveals our bodies as enclosed in a space which could be occupied by other objects. He claims that proprioception can reveal the overall layout of our body as being such that a space exists between our two hands. Now this claim could not be arrived at on the basis of there being empty space between two sensations. It could only be arrived at on the basis of there being empty space between two body parts, where awareness of this bodily position as of there being space between the hands is arrived at independently of sensation. This is because, if the criteria of identity of sensations does not depend on the relation of these sensations to the parts and bounds of the body, which is the claim contained within 3ii), then the sensations could either be separated by empty space or by space which is occupied by the body. Sensation alone, as individuated in 3ii), does not indicate whether there is space or not between two sensations. (Obviously I am talking of two sensations which are in two separate body parts, where the two body parts, to be considered separate, must be separated by a joint - such as the knee or the multiple joints that separate the two hands. Were the two sensations in question not occurring in two body parts that were independently movable, then clearly, and trivially, it would not be possible for there to exist empty space between them.)

In sum, Martin invokes overall bodily position in order to show how sensation is always experienced as falling within our body, and this is necessary for the truth of 3ii). He can only invoke bodily position, independently of sensation, on the basis of O'Shaughnessy's theory that awareness of bodily position is immediate. 

Conclusion

We have attempted to draw out some difficulties with what may at first have seemed an intuitive and uncontroversial picture of tactile sensation - a picture of tactile sensation as perception of spatial locations where these spatial locations serve as the units out of which we build our awareness of bodily position. We showed that the truth of this picture hinged on the truth of 3). However, it proved difficult to show how 3) could be true. Rather than continue to labour under this overall picture of tactile sensation as the epistemic foundation of our awareness of bodily position, we reversed the direction of explanation, taking an immediate awareness of bodily position as the epistemic foundation of tactile sensation. Brian O'Shaughnessy's perceptual theory, and Michael Martin's development of it - if correct - enable this reversal. We did not critically assess O'Shaughnessy and Martins' theories, at least not in much depth. However, by giving a clear account of the difficulties they may resolve, it is hoped that the scope and potential power of these theories has been demonstrated.
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